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ESSAY

The Company Vijay Kedia Bought At Its IPO Price

19 August 2026

The company is Zaggle Prepaid Ocean Services Limited (NSE: ZAGGLE, BSE: 543985).

Here is the full record, and then the part that actually matters.


What Happened

On 18 August 2026, Kedia Securities Private Limited, the investment arm of Vijay Kedia, bought 20,00,000 shares of Zaggle in a bulk deal on the exchange.

Deal value: ₹32,94,40,000. That works out to ₹164.72 per share.

The day before, on 17 August, the stock had touched ₹160.48, its lowest level in 52 weeks. It closed at ₹165.94 on the day Kedia bought.

Zaggle listed in September 2023. The IPO price band was ₹156 to ₹164, and anchor investors were allotted at ₹164.

Three years later, one of India’s most followed investors paid ₹164.72 for the same share.

From its all-time high of ₹581.70 on 16 December 2024, the stock is down roughly 71 percent.

One thing worth noting about the deal itself

Four other names appear on the 18 August tape: Hrti, Junomoneta Finsol, QE Securities and Microcurves Trading. Every one of them shows up on both the buy and sell side. Microcurves bought and sold the identical 7,30,405 shares. Those are proprietary desks crossing the disclosure threshold intraday, not investors taking a position.

Kedia Securities is the only one-directional buyer on the entire tape that day. No Kedia entity appears as a seller, so this is not a transfer between his own accounts.


Why The Stock Fell

Zaggle reported Q1 FY27 on 14 August. Revenue came in at ₹423 crore and profit after tax at ₹17.5 crore.

The headline everywhere was “profit down 57 percent.” That number is sequential, measured against the March quarter, not year on year. March is seasonally Zaggle’s strongest quarter because of year-end corporate spending. Measured year on year, revenue actually grew 28 percent.

The real problem is not the top line. It is this:

Adjusted EBITDA margin fell to 8.2 percent from 10.1 percent a year ago.

Revenue grew 28 percent. Profit did not follow. That is what the market reacted to, and it is a fair thing to react to.


The Number Most People Miss

Zaggle is usually described as a fintech SaaS company. Look at where the revenue actually comes from in Q1 FY27:

Revenue stream Q1 FY27 Share of total Propel Points ₹251 Cr 59% Program fees ₹160 Cr 38% SaaS platform fees ₹12.5 Cr 3% Total ₹423 Cr

Propel is 59 percent of revenue and management disclosed its margin at 7.1 percent consolidated, and 5 percent on a standalone basis.

Propel is the rewards and gift card business. Zaggle buys vouchers in bulk from merchants at a discount and books the full transaction value as revenue on a gross basis. The cost of buying those vouchers sits in expenses. So a large, fast-growing, very thin-margin line runs straight through the top of the P&L.

The SaaS piece, the genuinely high-margin software business, is ₹12.5 crore out of ₹423 crore.

This is why the revenue CAGR looks explosive while margins sit in single digits. It is also why the market stopped applying a software multiple to the stock. Zaggle currently trades around 21 times earnings, not a SaaS multiple.

There is a second layer to this. On program fees, management disclosed that cashback paid out was 66.3 percent of program fee revenue in Q1 FY27, up from 65.7 percent a year earlier. Two thirds of that line goes back out as customer incentives.

Strip both effects out and the economically meaningful revenue base is a small fraction of the ₹423 crore headline. (That last calculation is mine, derived from management’s disclosed figures, not a company-reported number.)

Nothing here is hidden. Management discloses the mix and the Propel margin openly on every call. But if you only read the revenue growth number, you will badly misjudge this business.


What Is Actually Improving

Three things in the quarter cut the other way.

Subsidiary profitability is inflecting. 86400 did ₹22 crore of revenue, up 29 percent, with EBITDA of ₹8.8 crore, up roughly 400 percent. GreenEdge did ₹44 crore of revenue, up 160 percent, with EBITDA of ₹4.3 crore. These are far better margin profiles than the core.

The Dice acquisition cost landed before its revenue did. Its costs were absorbed in Q1 with no matching revenue, which mechanically depressed the quarter. Management expects Dice to contribute ₹15 to 16 crore in FY27 at gross margins above 90 percent, starting Q2.

Distribution keeps expanding. A three year corporate card agreement with Daimler India Commercial Vehicles was signed on 27 July 2026. Fleet transactions grew 43 percent and transaction value 53 percent year on year.

Promoters hold 44.3 percent, with only 0.55 percent pledged. Dr Raj Narainam is Executive Chairman and Avinash Ramesh Godkhindi is MD and CEO. Both were selling shareholders in the IPO.


The Risks

  1. Margin, not growth, is the issue. EBITDA margin fell from 10.1 to 8.2 percent while revenue grew 28 percent.

  2. Revenue quality. 59 percent of revenue comes from a 7.1 percent margin business booked on a gross basis. Headline growth overstates economic growth.

  3. Program fee growth slowed to 10 percent year on year, well below overall revenue growth.

  4. Cashback is rising as a share of program fees, at 66.3 percent versus 65.7 percent.

  5. Revenue growth is decelerating, at 28 percent against 40 to 45 percent in earlier quarters.

  6. Return on equity is 10.4 percent over three years, low for a business the market once valued as software.

  7. No dividend has been paid despite reported profits.

  8. Growth is partly inorganic, through Span Across, Mobileware, Effiasoft, Unobanc and Dice. Integration and consolidation are worth watching closely.

  9. Regulatory dependence. The card business runs through banking partners governed by RBI rules.

  10. One bulk deal is not a thesis. Kedia has entered and exited positions before. His entry price is not a floor, and the stock made a fresh 52-week low the day before he bought.


Disclaimer - This content is for educational purposes only. It is not investment advice, not a recommendation to buy, sell or hold any security, and contains no price target or entry level. All figures are sourced from exchange filings, company disclosures and management commentary as on 19 August 2026. Please consult your financial advisor before investing.

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