Why Sunil Singhania Just Bought Mrs Bectors Food Specialities

What actually happened

On 15 July 2026, Abakkus Investment Managers Private Limited, the firm founded by Sunil Singhania, bought 29,39,588 shares of Mrs Bectors Food Specialities in an open market bulk deal on the NSE at an average price of ₹168.97 per share.

That works out to roughly ₹49.67 crore, or about 0.95 percent of the company.

Two details make this worth studying rather than just reacting to.

First, it was a fresh entry, not a top up of an existing position. Second, it was an open market purchase. Not a preferential allotment, not an IPO anchor allocation, not an inter-se transfer between related parties. He competed for those shares on the exchange like everybody else and paid the market price. That distinction matters more than most people realise, because allotments are negotiated and open market buys are not.

The next day the stock rose 13.68 percent to ₹192.09, its biggest single day move since September 2024.

Who is Sunil Singhania

Before founding Abakkus in 2018, Singhania was Chief Investment Officer for Equities at Reliance Mutual Fund, one of the largest equity pools in the country. He is a CFA charterholder and was the first Indian to serve on the CFA Institute’s global board of governors.

One correction worth making, because it gets repeated everywhere: Abakkus is not a mutual fund. It runs PMS and AIF products, which is a different regulatory category with different investors and different constraints. So this is his firm deploying client capital under his process, not necessarily his personal money.

What the company actually does

Mrs Bectors Food Specialities was incorporated in 1995 as Quaker Cremica Foods. It runs two brands you have almost certainly eaten:

• Cremica, a leading premium and mid premium biscuit brand in North India

• English Oven, a premium bakery brand selling breads, buns, kulchas and frozen bakery products

It is also a white label partner for Walmart in the United States, and a preferred supplier to some of India’s largest QSR chains, cloud kitchens and multiplex operators. It listed in December 2020 at an issue price of ₹288, with the IPO subscribed 198 times.

The growth record is real. Revenue went from ₹988 crore in FY22 to ₹2,044 crore in FY26. That is a 20 percent CAGR over four years, and FY26 was the first year it crossed the ₹2,000 crore mark. Within that, the biscuits vertical compounded at 20 percent and the bakery vertical at 23 percent.

So why did the stock fall 56 percent?

This is the part most people get wrong, and it is the whole story.

The stock is down about 56 percent from its all time high of ₹439.20, made on 20 September 2024. Note that figure is adjusted for the 1:5 stock split, so on screen back then you would have seen roughly ₹2,196.

The reflexive explanation is “profits stopped growing.” FY26 profit was roughly flat, operating margin slipped to about 12.7 percent from 14.2 percent, and Q4 revenue and profit both fell sequentially. All true. But that is the symptom, not the cause.

Here is the cause. Between FY24 and FY26, Mrs Bectors spent roughly ₹815 crore on capex and commissioned three new plants in twelve months, at Dhar in Madhya Pradesh, Kolkata, and Khopoli in Maharashtra. FY26 capex alone was around ₹400 crore.

When a manufacturer switches on new plants, the costs arrive immediately. Depreciation, staffing, power, maintenance. The revenue arrives later, as those lines ramp toward full utilisation. So margins compress even when the underlying business is healthy. This is called an operating leverage lag, and it is one of the most consistently misread situations in the market, because the reported numbers look weak precisely when the investment is being made.

The financing detail matters too. The company raised ₹400 crore through a QIP in September 2024 at ₹1,550 per share, which is ₹310 on a split adjusted basis, from buyers including the Government of Singapore, SBI Multicap, Axis Mutual Fund, Prudential Assurance and Arisaig Asia. That equity funding is why this heavy capex did not load the balance sheet with debt. Debt to equity sits around 0.34 and the balance sheet is close to net cash.

Which produces a striking comparison. Institutional investors paid ₹310 per share in September 2024. Singhania paid ₹168.97 in July 2026. Roughly 45 percent less, for a company that has since added three plants and crossed ₹2,000 crore in revenue.

What he may be seeing

I cannot read his mind, so treat this as a framework rather than a claim.

The heavy spending phase is ending. Management has indicated FY26 was peak capex at about ₹400 crore, and that from FY27 it normalises to roughly ₹100 to ₹110 crore a year. If that holds, two things change at once: free cash flow improves as the capex drain stops, and margins improve as the new plants fill up.

Management has guided to mid to high teens revenue growth and an EBITDA margin of 14 to 15 percent, with an aspiration to reach 14 percent or better in FY27, against roughly 12.6 percent in FY26.

The distribution push is concrete rather than aspirational. The company plans to add 40,000 billed outlets this financial year, is using the Indore plant to push into central and western India beyond its northern stronghold, and targets weighted availability of 40 to 45 percent by 2030. English Oven has compounded at high teens over four years and is benefiting from quick commerce, with the premiumisation target set at 65 percent.

So the honest framing is this. Somebody buying here is buying the gap between capex ending and operating leverage arriving. That is a real thing that happens. It is also a thing that sometimes does not happen on schedule.

The risks, stated plainly

The turn is a forecast, not a fact. Every margin recovery assumption above is management guidance. Plants can ramp slower than planned. Guidance gets missed.

It is not cheap. Even after a 56 percent fall, the stock trades at roughly 43.8 times earnings. You are not buying a statistically cheap asset. You are buying an expected recovery.

The competition is brutal. Britannia, Parle and ITC have deeper pockets, wider distribution and more shelf space.

Input costs swing hard. Wheat, palm oil and sugar move margins directly, and this is a business with thin margins to begin with.

Export exposure carries uncertainty. Tariffs and West Asia disruption both affect the export book.

The recent trend is still soft. In Q4 FY26, revenue fell about 9 percent and profit about 7 percent compared to the previous quarter. The recovery has not shown up in the numbers yet.

Position size tells you something. Abakkus bought under 1 percent of the company. For a fund of that size, this is a starter position, not a bet the farm conviction call.

Minor governance notes. The CCPA fined the company ₹1 lakh over a misleading “100 percent” claim. The amount is immaterial, but it is on the record. The exchange also sought a clarification from the company on 22 June 2026 regarding a news article.

What to actually watch

Rather than watching the price, watch these four things over the next two to three quarters:

1. EBITDA margin. Does it move from 12.7 percent toward the guided 14 percent? This is the entire thesis in one number.

2. Capex. Does FY27 spending actually drop to the ₹100 to ₹110 crore range, or does another project appear?

3. Utilisation at Dhar, Kolkata and Khopoli. New plants either fill up or they do not.

4. Whether Abakkus adds. The September 2026 shareholding pattern will show whether that 0.95 percent grew, shrank or vanished. A fund that keeps buying is telling you something a single bulk deal cannot.

How to verify all of this yourself

Do not take my word for any of it. Every number above traces to a primary source:

• The bulk deal: NSE bulk deals disclosure, 15 July 2026, or the Screener “trades” tab

• FY26 results and the ₹988 crore to ₹2,044 crore figure: the Q4 and FY26 earnings call transcript dated 29 May 2026, filed on BSE and NSE

• Capex, guidance and margin targets: the same transcript, plus the Q2 FY26 call

• The QIP: the company’s September 2024 exchange filings

• Shareholding: the quarterly shareholding pattern on BSE

A closing thought

A well known investor buying a stock is a data point. It is not research, and it is definitely not a reason to buy. Singhania has been wrong before, as every investor has. He is also managing a portfolio with a mandate, a time horizon and a risk budget that have nothing to do with yours.

What makes this situation worth studying is not that he bought. It is why the stock was available at that price in the first place. The market punished a company for spending money on growth. Whether that punishment was correct is a question the next four quarters will answer, not this post.

Educational content only. This is not investment advice, and it is not a buy, sell or hold recommendation. I am NISM certified and not a SEBI registered research analyst or investment adviser. I do not hold a position in this stock. Please do your own research or consult a SEBI registered adviser before investing. Markets carry risk, including the risk of permanent loss of capital.